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ABSTRACT 
The launcher hold and release system (LHRS) was successfully used, for the first time, for GSLV-Dl 
mission after thorough test and evaluation, in line with reliability and quality assurance (R&QA) requirements. 
Various R&QA techniques are applied to make LHRS failure-free. Failure mode effect and criticality analysis 
(FMECA) was used as a tool for identifying critical failure modes. Single-point failure modes (SPFMs) identified 
from FMECA are strengthened by design modifications and the same are verified by testing. Testing philosophy 
is tailored to have more number of tests at the system level. Capability demonstration tests and failure mode 
simulation tests were carried out during system qualification phase. Acceptance tests are done on the flight 
hardware at launch pad to demonstrate better confidence on the system. This paper illustrates how R&QA 
techniques complimented and added value at different stages in the development cycle of LHRS, by means of 
few case studies. Testing methodologies adopted and problems encountered during the development and 
qualification phases are described in brief. Various problems surfaced during preparation for flight are also 
discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The geo-synchronous satellite launch vehicle 
(GSLV) has four liquid motors strapped to the 
solid core motor. As per the lift-off sequence, the 
strap-on motors are first ignited and their 
performances verified before the core motor is 
ignited. Disturbances like surface wind and 
failure of any one or more strap-on motors to 
build-up thrust will destabilise the vehicle on the 
launch pad. The launcher hold and release system 
(LHRS) is used to hold the vehicle in stable 
condition against all kinds of disturbing forces. 
The launch computer releases the hold by LHRS 
after confirming satisfactory performance of the 
strap-on motors. The core motor is ignited only 
after confirming LHRS release. 
The LHRS is designed and qualified by the 
Aerospace Mechanism Group of VSSC with the 
support of various agencies. The LHRS was 
successfully used, for the first time, for GSLV-Dl 
flight. The LHRS is made up of four hydraulically 
actuated release mechanisms with its associated 
instrumentation system. The release mechanism 
works on the collet-grip principle. It is actuated by a 
multiple redundant hydraulic system, which is 
based on accumulator circuit. The instrumentation 
system is used for system health monitoring, issue 
of release command, and to obtain confirmation of 
release. Failure or malfunction of any one or more 
of the components/subsystems can cause the launch 
to be aborted or can be catastrophic to the mission. 
It can also cause damage to the launch pad. 
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2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The LHRS is basically made up of four release 
mechanisms, a multiple redundant hydraulic system 
and an instrumentation system. The mechanisms'are 
symmetrically oriented on the launch pedestal. 
They are interfaced with the longerons of vehicle 
core base shroud. The mechanism has a collet with a 
number of concentric fingers. The fingers are 
deflected radially inwards by drawing it through a 
sleeve (designed to work as a piston also) to grip 
over the tapered surface of a shaft. The.collet is 
connected to the base of the unit and the shaft is 
connected to the vehicle core base shroud. A 
pretensioning nut on the shaft preloads the 
mechanism. The pre-loaded mechanism is released 
by moving the sleevelpiston by hydraulic power. 
The piston movement allows the collet fingers to 
move radially outwards and assume. their natural 
position so as to release the grip over shaft. A disc 
spring stack pulls up the shaft. A pictorial view of 
the mechanism in assembled condition is shown in 
Fig. 1. 
Figure 1. Mabanism wembly 
The hydraulic system has two independent 
chains, each having a bank of accumulators as 
stored power source. A hydraulic powerpack with 
an airroperated pump, relief valve, filters and 
associated components charges both banks of 
accumulators and also fills the pipelines connecting 
the mechanisms. The accumulator pressure is 
isolated from the mechanism by cartridge 
valve-soleniod valve logic. Energising the solenoid 
valve allows the cartridge valve to open. The high 
pressure oil from accumulators flows to the 
mechanism and moves its piston. The hydraulic 
system works on blowdown mode. Figure 2 
presents the hydraulic system schematic. The 
hydraulic system is so designed that actuation of 
any one solenoid valve, out of the four solenoid 
valves provided, will emure release of all 
mechanisms. This provides four levels of 
redundancy in actuating elements and two levels of 
redundancy in pipelines. 
The instrumentation system is used for 
measuringlmonitoring parameters representing 
(i) system health (ii) mechanism-release process 
(iii) confirmation of release, and (iv) interfacing 
with launch computer system. During launch 
operations, all LHRS-related commands are issued 
directly from the automatic launch sequence 
program running in the launch computer system. 
3. RELIABILITY TOOLS 
Failure mode effects and criticality analysis1 
(FMECA) was used during different phases of 
LHRS realisation. The FMECA made at each phase 
focused on the single-point failure modes (SPFMs). 
The SPFMs identified were either eliminated 
through design modification or through extensive 
testing to confirm adequacy of design margin and 
also to eliminate doubts on the system functioning. 
The FMECA for LHRS was accomplished in two 
ways, namely, the hardware approach and the 
functional approach. The hardware approach of 
FMECA basically analyses the potential failure 
possibilities of individual hardware items. This is a 
bottom-upapproach. This study helps to identify 
the weak links that have to be strengthened with 
alternate routes or change in the component type. 
The hardware approach was followed in LHRS in 
the initial phase of system design and component 
selection. 
The functional approach recognises that every 
item is designed to perform a number of functions 
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Figure 2. Schematic of hydraulic system 
that can be class~fied as output. Thls approach was 4.1 Testing Methodology 
adapted in the test~ng phase to bu~ld  confidence m 
the system. In thls regard, test~ng was done at Tes t s  for  sys tem deve lopment  and qual~ficat~on were planned as 
sub-assembly or system level. Specla1 attention was 
given to the area that may cause SPFM, leadmg to (a) Screening tests on components/modules 
system1miHsion failure. (b) System-level tests to demonstrate the reliability 
4. TESTING PHILOSOPHY requirements. These tests Include failure mode tests, capab~l~ty  demonstrat~on tests, and 
The tests were planned to demonstrate the off-nommal cond~t~on tests 
reliability requirements specified for LHRS, based 
on the GSLV mission rehabllity specifications. The 
reliability requirement of LHRS was 0.98658, 
which calls for 68 cycles of tests to meet the 
system-level reliability. 
Mechanism was designed, fabricated and 
tested in-house, whereas hydraulic components 
were procured from reputed industries. Hence, it 
was decided to carry out limited-screening tests on 
the hydraulic componentslmodules and full-fledged 
system-level tests to meet ' the  reliability 
requirements. 
(c) Environmental tests, namely, acoustic and 
vibration tests on functionally critical 
components 
(d) Functional test simulating one chain alone, along 
with seap-on engine test, to verify functioning of 
LHRS in the actual service environment 
A simulated test rig was setup at the laboratory 
to carry out all system-level development and 
qualification tests. T h ~ s  was followed by a series of 
tests at launch pad with actual vehicle interface. 
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Following are the types of tests done at system 
level. 
Normal configuration with two chains and four 
release valves, load and pressure nominal 
Off-nominal conditions with oneltwo chains and 
onelfour release valves, load and pressure vzried 
Failure mode simulation with one cham, one 
release valve 
Capability demonstration with a reduced number 
of accumulators, drain valve kept open 
5. SYSTEM-LEVEL TESTING-PROBLEMS 
ENCOUNTERED . 
A number of problems were encountered 
during system-level testing. Two such problems 
have been described as case studies 1 and 2. 
Case Study 1 
The FMECA study has pointed out that the 
environment generated by firing of strap-on engines 
can cause failurelmalfunction of LHRS. A 
functional test of LHRS in the strap-on engine 
firing environment was hence recommended. To 
meet this, a functional test of LHRS, simulating one 
chain alone was carried out along with one of the 
strap-on engine hot test. This test was successful. It 
proved the robustness of design, particularly the 
release mechanism. In addition to the above test, the 
mechanism and solenoid valve were qualified for 
the predicted acoustic and vibration levels of 
strap-on engine firing for an extended period of 60 s. 
These tests were very useful to avoid a last minute 
vibration test which otherwise would have to be 
done to qualify for the higher peak vibration levels 
recorded during the first launch attempt. 
Case Study 2 
The LHRS system was configured with two 
chains having independent power sources. Check 
valves isolated the chains. A leak in the check 
valves makes the independent chains connected 
causing loss in chain-level redundancy. The 
FMECA pointed out that a combination of: (i) 
external leak in any of the field joint or components 
and (ii) leak in check valve can lead to a system 
failure. This was suggested to be verified by testing. 
Durlng failure mode simulation testing, i.e. 
simulation of total external leak in one chain, it was 
observed that the pressure in the alternate chain also 
was being reduced. Chain isolation was hence 
modified by putting zero leak cone seated solenoid 
valves, two numbers in series for redundancy, in 
between the chains. 
6. FLIGHT EXPERIENCE 
During the flight phase, two problems were 
cropped up. These were: 
During system preparation for launch, one 
accumulator showed oil trace causing an 
increased drop of accumulator pressure. After 
detailed analysis, it was decided to go ahead for 
the flight. This decision was based on the 
acceptance test data obtained from the functional 
acceptance testing of the LHRS at lower bound 
accumulator pressure conducted at the start of 
launch campaign. The LHRS system worked 
satisfactorily, holding the vehicle during the first 
launch attempt. 
Vibration levels recorded at the LHRS 
mechanism and solenoid valve locations during 
the first launch attempt were higher than the 
levels qualified earlier. This higher g-level was 
for a short duration. After detailed analysis, the 
system was cleared for second launch attempt on 
the basis of the environmental qualification test 
carried out for an extended period of 60s on the 
suggestions based on FMECA findings. During 
the second launch attempt, the system worked 
successfully in releasing the hold. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The following concluions have been drawn: 
Detailed FMECA analysis and updating the same 
at each phase of design focusing on SPFM aids to 
refine the design and the testing methodology. By 
this, troublesome features are either eliminated or 
their impact on system functioning verified by 
extensive testing. 
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